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Payment of Compensation Award During Appeal
Under the Workmen's Compensation Act the employer is
required to make payment of a Commission award until all
questions are fully determined. Other sections of the Code,
and numerous decisions interpreting this section, have been
in conflict. The Court, in Case v. Hermitage Cotton Mills,'
carefully reviews and considers all previous decisions and
sets forth the conclusion of the Court with regard to the
employer-employee status, following appeal from an award.
The opinion on the facts in the case is limited to deciding that
the general provision of the Code allowing a supersedeas bond
to stay the execution of judgment does not apply to awards
under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The dictum of the
opinion is far more significant than the determination of the
case before the Court. The Court construed the supersedeas
section2 as follows:
1. The only payment required to be made by the employer
is the weekly compensation accruing after the date of the
Commission's award.
2. Should the Commission deny compensation and the Court
reverse the Commission, the weekly payments to be made
by the employer should commence from the date of the Circuit
Court's decision, and not from the date of the Commission's
decision.
3. Payment of the weekly benefits shall continue from the
date of the Commission's award until final decision by the
Supreme Court, and the provision by the general law3 relating
to a supersedeas bond is not applicable.
Injuries Arising Out of and In the Course of Employment-
Personal Mission v. Employment
In Fowler v. Abbott Motor Co.,4 the claimant was a me-
chanic for the defendant motor company and was on call
*Attorney at Law, Greenville, S. C.
1. 236 S. C. 515, 115 S. E. 2d 64 (1960).
2. CODE OF LAws OF SOUTH CARROLINA § 72-356 (1952).
3. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA §§ 7-412 and 7-418 (1952).
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twenty-four hours a day, employer furnishing him an auto-
mobile to use in answering service calls during all hours and
paying toll charges for a telephone located at the residence of
the employee. The employee received a telephone call and
was overheard to say, "I'll see about it." In leaving he ad-
vised his family, "I'll be back in a minute." He stopped at a
store and mentioned something about a car motor somewhere.
A short time later the employee was involved in a collision
which rendered him totally - mentally and physically - in-
competent. The Court denied compensation on the ground
that the evidence failed to show that the injury occurred at
a place where his duty required him to be.
Similar to the Fowler case, in Corley v. South Carolina Tax
Comm'n.,5 the deceased had gone to Columbia on the previous
day to attend a football game and was returning to his home
in Greenwood, South Carolina when he received fatal injuries.
Deceased had stated to his wife that it would be necessary
for him to make a trip to Columbia to pick up some returns
to enable him to finish an audit; however, no effort was made
by the deceased to go to the office of the Tax Commission.
Deceased made one telephone call in Columbia and met one
business acquaintance, but he transacted no business. Com-
pensation was denied, the Court holding that "The mere possi-
bility that an employee was engaged in performing a service
on behalf of his employer at the time of his accidental injury
was insufficient."
Stronger evidence on behalf of the claimant resulted in the
Court affirming an award in Halpern v). DeJay Stores, Inc.'
In this case the deceased left the store during working hours
expressing an intention to attempt collection of several de-
linquent accounts and also to make a personal visit to Chester.
His death resulted on the route to Chester after he had passed
the last turn-off point to his customer. The Court held that it
could reasonably be inferred that he was in the course of his
employment although he was unwittingly lost.
Again an award was affirmed in an unwitnessed death case
where an employee was drowned during a lull period in the
employment. Steed v. Mount Pleasant Seafood Co." The em-
ployer did not expressly permit nor forbid the practice of
5. 237 S. C. 439,117 S. E. 2d 577 (1960).
6. 236 S. C. 587, 115 S. E. 2d 297 (1960).
7. 236 S. C. 253, 113 S. E. 2d 827 (1960).
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swimming during lull periods and there was evidence to sup-
port the finding of accidental drowning.
A five minute deviation by an employee from the course
of employment to make a wedge for the use of a fellow em-
ployee, although entirely personal, was so trivial a deviation
that it could be fairly characterized as insubstantial and the
award was affirmed in Cauley v. Ross Builders Supplies, Inc.
8
Employees Within Act
The plaintiff in Chavis v. E. L DuPont De Nemours & Co.9
was an injured employee of a sub-contractor seeking to main-
tain a common law action against the general contractor for
damages on account of an injury. Plaintiff received compen-
sation from the general contractor's workmen's compensation
insurance carrier, but disclaimed realization of the identity of
the payer of compensation. His theory was that the owner
and the sub-contractor were his employers within the meaning
of the Act, and, since the general contractor had no duty to
compensate him under the Act, the general contractor was
not entitled to the Act's protection against common law lia-
bility. The District Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, sus-
tained an order for summary judgment against the plaintiff,
stating:
The plaintiff, reading § 71-112 narrowly, contends a
general contractor is responsible for compensation of em-
ployees of subcontractors only if engaged in work which
is not the business of the owner. Indeed, it is true that
§ 72-111 applies only if the work done is the business
of the owner, and § 72-112 only if it is not. It is evident,
however, that once the highest responsible person is de-
termined by reference to §§ 72-111 and 112, every in-
termediate contractor or subcontractor under him shoul-
ders the same, indeed the primary, obligation, for the
'principal contractor' is entitled to indemnity from him
and to call him in to defend the compensation claim.
The filing of a Workmen's Compensation policy with the
Commission purporting to insure the defendant employer
without the knowledge of the employer and without other
evidence indicating the intention of the employer to come
8. 238 S. C. 38, 118 S. E. 2d 879 (1961).
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within the terms of the Act was held insufficient to establish
the intention of the employer to operate under the Compensa-
tion Act in Dependents of Sweeney v. Cape Fear Wood Corp.10
Unusual Exertion or Strain
Over a period of two or three weeks claimant worked un-
usually long hours, was subject to a work environment that
was unusually difficult because of several incidents, and
greatly over-exerted himself in his performance of his duty.
The Court in Kearse v. South Carolina Wildlife Resources
Dep't." held that a thrombosis suffered by an employee was
compensable if induced by unexpected strain or over-exertion
in the performance of his employment under unusual or ex-
traordinary conditions. Although a pre-existing pathology
may have been a contributing factor, and although the work
is the same general type in which the employee is regularly
involved, these would be no bar to compensation as the phrase
"unusual or excessive strain" is not so limited in meaning as
to include only the work of an entirely different character
than that customarily done.
Again, where the claimant established that preceding a
thrombosis his working hours had increased from eight and
one-half to sixteen hours per day in order to perform extra
duty, the Court held the case compensable, but remanded be-
cause of the finding of the total disability rather than partial
disability. Wynn v. People's Natural Gas Co.12 Medical testi-
mony established that claimant was able to work if he would
avoid undue physical or mental strain. The Court declared:
total disability does not require complete helplessness.
Inability to perform common labor is total disability for
one who is not qualified by training or experience for
any other employment....
[One] who is capable of performing other work that is
continuously available to him will not be deemed totally
disabled because he is unable to resume the duties of the
particular occupation in which he was engaged at the
time of his injury ... The generally accepted test of
total disability is inability to perform services other than
those that are 'so limited in quality, dependability, or
10. 237 S. C. 471,118 S. E. 2d 70 (1961).
11. 236 S. C. 540, 115 S. E. 2d 183 (1960).
12. 238 S. C. 1,118 S. E. 2d 812 (1961).
1961]
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quantity that a reasonable stable market for them does
not exist.'
Likewise, the Court denied the claim for compensation for
a heart attack where there was no evidence of any increased
working hours and where there was an absence of evidence
such as that presented in the Kearse case. The claimant was
a jailer and suffered a heart attack following a busy night at
the City Jail. West v. City of Spartanburg.13
Aggravation of Pre-Existing Injury
Where there is an aggravation of a pre-existing condition
by injury or accident, any resulting disability or death is
compensable. This applies to an aggravation of a -dormant
cancerous condition, provided expert medical testimony con-
cludes that the result "most probably" came from the alleged
cause. Glover v. Columbia Hosp.14 It is equally applicable to
osteoarthritis. Daley v. Public Savings Life Ins. Co.' 5
Change of Condition
In Krell v. South Carolina Highway Dep't. 6 claimant sought
to recover compensation for a hernia on an application for a
change of condition following an original back injury. No
claim was filed for hernia at the time of the hearing. Com-
pensation was denied. The Court said at page 589:
If [the] claimant sustained injuries at the time of the
original action which he knew about at the time of his
claim but for some reason failed to include in the claim,
he cannot for the first time assert disability from these
injuries in a petition based on 'Change of condition.'
Statute of Limitations
Claimant was injured and was directed to the company phy-
sician. She was informed that her condition had nothing to do
with the accident-and was referred to her family physician.
Claim for compensation was not filed within the year as re-
quired by the Statute, the claimant contending that the em-
ployer was estopped to invoke the Statute by his conduct.
13. 236 S. C. 553, 115 S. E. 2d 295 (1960).
14. 236 S. C. 410, 114 S. E. 2d 565 (1960).
15. 236 S. C. 236, 113 S. E. 2d 758 (1960).
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The claim was denied on the ground that there was no evidence
of any conduct on the part of the employer that would warrant
an estoppel. Case v. Hermitage Cotton Mills. 17
Specific Loss v. Total Disability
Claimant suffered a severe injury to his leg as the result
of a fall. One doctor rated the claimant with a 60 % loss of use
of his right leg, and other medical testimony established that
the claimant had a 507 to 75% loss of the whole body, one
physician stating that the injury gave the claimant almost a
total disability. The Commission found that the only injury
causing disability was to his right leg, but awarded the claim-
ant total disability. The Supreme Court after first affirming
the award, granted a petition for a re-hearing and reversed,
stating where the injury is confined to the scheduled mem-
ber and there is no impairment of any other part of the body
because of such injury, the employee is limited to the scheduled
compensation even though other considerations, such as age,
lack of training, or other conditions peculiar to the individual,
effect a total or partial industrial capacity. Singleton v.
Young Lumber Co.'8 To obtain compensation in addition to
that scheduled for the injured member, claimant must show
that some other part of his body is affected.
Rule of Liberal Construction
Claimant alleged an accident aggravating an osteoarthritic
condition. Claimant's medical witness stated, "It's possible"
that the condition was aggravated by injury. Compensation
denied. Cross v. Concrete Material.1 9 Rejecting the contention
that lay testimony was sufficient to sustain the finding of
causal connection, the case was distinguished from prior cases
where the disability was visible, external, and subject to ob-
servation. The Court further declared that the rule of liberal
construction of the law did not apply to the finding of facts.
Conceding that some courts do apply the rule that where
there is a doubt about the facts, the doubt will be resolved in
favor of the claimant, the Court stated that the rule in South
Carolina is different, and that the Court will affirm a factual
finding of the Commission if there is "any competent evi-
dence of the record to sustain it and reverse it only if there
is not."
17. 236 S. C. 284, 113 S. E. 2d 794 (1960).
18. 236 S. C. 454, 114 S. E. 2d 837 (1960).
19. 236 S. C. 440, 114 S. E. 2d 828 (1960).
1961]
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Contributory Negligence of Workmen's Compensation
Employer No Bar to An Action Against
the Third Party
Deceased was killed while he was a passenger in thie truck
of his employer. Compensation death benefits were paid by
the employer and thereafter an action filed by the employer's
insurance carrier against the third party. The jury found
contributory negligence on the part of the employer, and
the circuit court denied recovery on the part of the insurance
carrier. The Supreme Court held "the contributory negligence
of the employer constitutes no defense to an action brought
by him or his carrier against a third party to recover com-
pensation paid." Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America v.
Odom.
20
20. 237 S. C. 167, 116 S. E. 2d 22 (1960).
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